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to exist in many Web applications due to developers’ lack of 
understanding of the problem and their unfamiliarity with 
current defenses’ strengths and limitations.
XSS EXPLOITS 
XSS exploits are similar to SQL injection, an original form 
of code injection. This type of attack exploits an applica-
tion’s output function that references poorly sanitized user 
input. However, SQL injection targets the query function 
that interacts with the database, whereas XSS exploits target 
the HTML output function that sends data to the browser. 
The basic idea of XSS injection is to use special char-
acters to cause Web browser interpreters to switch from 
a data context to a code context.1 For example, when an 
HTML page references a user input as data, an attacker 
might include the tag <script>, which can invoke the Java- 
Script interpreter. If the application does not filter such spe-
cial characters, XSS injection is successful, and the attacker 
can perform exploits such as account hijacking, cookie 
poisoning, denial of service (DoS), and Web content ma-
nipulation. Typical input sources that attackers manipulate 
include HTML forms, cookies, URLs, and external files. At-
tackers often favor JavaScript, but other kinds of client-side 
A ccording to security experts, cross-site scripting is among the most serious and common threats in Web applications today, surpassing buffer over-flows—the number one vulnerability for the past 
decade. In 2010, XSS ranked first in the Mitre Common 
Weakness Enumeration (CWE)/SANS Institute list of Top 
25 Most Dangerous Software Errors (http://cwe.mitre.org/
top25) and second in the Open Web Application Security 
Project (OWASP) Top 10 list of security risks (https://www.
owasp.org/index.php/Top_10). Several major websites 
including Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, eBay, Google, and 
McAfee have been the targets of XSS exploits.
XSS is the result of a weakness inherent in many Web 
applications’ security mechanisms: the absence or insuf-
ficient sanitization of user inputs. XSS flaws exist in Web 
applications written in various programming languages 
such as PHP, Java, and .NET where application webpages 
reference unrestricted user inputs. Attackers inject mali-
cious code via these inputs, thereby causing unintended 
script executions by clients’ browsers. 
Researchers have proposed multiple XSS solutions 
ranging from simple static analysis to complex runtime 
protection mechanisms. However, vulnerabilities continue 
Researchers have proposed multiple solutions to cross-site scripting, 
but vulnerabilities continue to exist in many Web applications due to 
developers’ lack of understanding of the problem and their unfamiliar-
ity with current defenses’ strengths and limitations. 
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PERSPECTIVES
1 <html>  
2 <title>Forum for Traveling Tips</title>  
3 <body>
4 <h1>Welcome <script language=“javascript” src=“travelerInfo.js”>
      </script>!</h1> 
<%
5  String action = request.getParameter(“Action”);
6  String place = request.getParameter(“Place”);
7  if (place !=null && action.equals(“Post”)) {
8       String new_tip = request.getParameter(“Tip”); 
9       if(new_tip.length < 100) {
10          stmt.executeUpdate(“INSERT INTO forum VALUES (” +   
                               place + “, ”+ new_tip + “)” );
11          out.println(“Your Post has been added under Place ‘”
                               + HTMLencode(place)+“’”);
        }
        else {
12          out.println(“Your Message:  ‘”+new_tip+ “’ is too long!”);
        }
   } 
13 else if (place !=null && action.equals(“View”)) {
14      ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery(“SELECT * FROM forum
             WHERE place= ”+place);
15      out.println(“Here are the tips about visiting this place...”);
16      while(rs.next()) { 
17           String tip = rs.getString(“tip”);
18           out.println(“‘”+tip+“’”);
        }
   }
 . . . 
%>
19 </body></html>   
<%
String HTMLencode(String value) { //server-side escaping method
20 value.replace(“&”, “&amp;”);
21 value.replace(“<”, “&lt;”);
22 value.replace(“>”, “&gt;”);
23 return value;
} 
%>
(a)
<SCRIPT> 
24 var pos=document.URL.indexOf(“User=”)+5; 
25 document.write(document.URL.substring(pos,document.URL.length));
</SCRIPT>
(b)
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scripts such as VBScript and Flash, which browsers can 
interpret, could cause XSS.
Injection methods
Depending on the ways HTML pages reference user 
inputs, XSS exploits can be broadly classified as reflected, 
stored, or DOM-based. 
Reflected or nonpersistent XSS holes are present in 
a Web application server program where it references 
accessed user input in the outgoing web-
page. This type of XSS exploit is common 
in error messages and search results. The 
XSSed project (http://xssed.com) recently 
reported multiple reflected XSS holes in 
McAfee that attackers could exploit to 
trick users into downloading viruses.
Stored or persistent XSS holes exist 
when a server program stores user input 
containing injected code in a persis-
tent data store such as a database and 
then references it in a webpage. Attacks 
against social networking sites com-
monly exploit this type of XXS flaw. 
An example is the Samy worm (www. 
securityfocus.com/brief/18), which, with-
in less than 24 hours after its release on 
4 October 2005, caused an exponential 
growth of friend lists for 1 million Myspace 
users, effectively creating a DoS attack. 
Both reflected and stored XSS holes 
result from improper handling of user 
inputs in server-side scripts. In contrast, 
DOM-based XSS holes appear in the Web 
application when client-side scripts 
reference user inputs, dynamically ob-
tained from the Document Object Model 
structure, without proper validation. 
Bugzilla’s bug 272620 (https://bugzilla.
mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=272620) is 
an example of a DOM-based XSS exploit. 
Example XSS exploits
Figure 1a shows a snippet from a server 
program, travelerTip.jsp, for a Web appli-
cation that lets travelers share tips about 
the places they have visited. The pro-
gram contains four input fields—“Action,” 
“Place,” “Tip,” and “User”—that attackers 
can manipulate. The program can be 
called via a URL such as the one shown 
in Figure 2a.
The statement at line 12 in Figure 1a 
is vulnerable to reflected XSS due to the 
replay of invalid input supplied by users 
(lines 8, 9, 12). An attacker could send a seemingly innocu-
ous URL link like the one in Figure 2b to a victim via e-mail 
or a social networking site. The script in bold will execute 
on the victim’s browser if the victim follows the link to 
travelingForum.
The statement at line 18 in Figure 1a is vulnerable to 
stored XSS, as the program stores user-supplied mes-
sages without proper sanitization (lines 8-10) and displays 
them to visitors (lines 14, 16-18). The URL in Figure 2c 
Figure 1. Example vulnerable (a) server-side program and (b) client-side script for 
a Web application that lets travelers share tips about the places they have visited. 
The program contains four input fields—“Action,” “Place,” “Tip,” and “User”—that 
attackers can manipulate. 
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contains JavaScript capable of sending the cli-
ent’s cookie information to a hacker’s website. 
Figure 3 illustrates this scenario in more detail.
The statement at line 4 in Figure 1a is vulner-
able to DOM-based XSS, as the program includes 
a JavaScript file, travelerInfo.js, shown in Figure 
1b, that accesses “User” information from the 
URL (line 24) and displays it, without any saniti-
zation, to users (line 25). Similar to the reflected 
XSS scenario, an attacker can exploit this vul-
nerability using a crafted URL like that shown 
in Figure 2d.
XSS DEFENSES
XSS defenses can be broadly classified into 
four types: defensive coding practices, XSS test-
ing, vulnerability detection, and runtime attack 
prevention. Table 1 compares various current 
techniques, which each have strengths and 
weaknesses.
Defensive coding 
Because XSS arises from the improper handling of 
inputs, using defensive coding practices that validate and 
sanitize inputs is the best way to eliminate XSS vulnerabili-
ties.1,2 Input validation ensures that user inputs conform to 
a required input format. 
There are four basic input sanitization options. Re-
placement and removal methods search for known bad 
characters (blacklist comparison); the former replaces 
them with nonmalicious characters, whereas the latter 
simply removes them. Escaping methods search for 
characters that have special meanings for client-side 
interpreters and remove those meanings. Restriction 
techniques limit inputs to known good inputs (whitelist 
comparison). 
Checking blacklisted characters in the inputs is more 
scalable, but blacklist comparisons often fail as it is 
difficult to anticipate every attack signature variant. 
Whitelist comparisons are considered more secure, but 
they can result in the rejection of many unlisted valid 
inputs. 
OWASP has issued rules that define proper escaping 
schemes for inputs referenced in different HTML output 
locations.1 For example, all three vulnerable statements 
in Figure 1 can be secured by applying proper escaping 
methods to the input variables at proper places, as in the 
following (escape() is the JavaScript library function that 
could encode HTML entities):
Hacker travelingForum Database hackerSite
1. Hacker posts a traveling tip via a crafted URL like the one shown in Figure 2c
2. travelingForum stores the information in a database, making the attack persistent
Client
3. Client visits travelerTip.jsp in “View” action
4. At travelerTip’s request, database sends the traveling tips stored
5. travelingForum displays the traveling tips to client
6. Client’s browser executes the malicious script contained in the tip posted by hacker,
     and the executed script sends the client’s credentials accessible from his cookies
Figure 3. Stored XSS attack scenario.
Figure 2. Example URLs that direct Web users to travelingForum. Malicious scripts that cause XSS exploits are highlighted in bold.  
(a) Ordinary URL that activates travelerTip.jsp in “View” action. (b) URL that causes reflected XSS: it contains malicious HTML meta-
script capable of making a refresh request to travelingForum’s server every 0.3 seconds, potentially causing a denial of service.  
(c) URL that creates stored XSS scenario: it contains JavaScript capable of sending the client’s cookie information to a hacker’s web-
site. (d) URL that causes DOM-based XSS: it contains script capable of injecting misleading information over an original message. 
http://travelingForum/travelerTip.jsp?Action=View&Place=Greece&User=Jesper
(a) 
http://travelingForum/travelerTip.jsp?Action=Post&Place=Greece&Tip=HiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiHiH 
      iHiHiHiHiHiHi<meta%20http-equiv=“refresh”%20content=“0;”>&User=Jesper
(b)
http://travelingForum/travelerTip.jsp?Action=Post&Place=Greece&Tip=<Script>document.location=‘http://hackerSite/   
      stealCookie.jsp?cookie=’+document.cookie;</Script>&User=Hacker
(c) 
http://travelingForum/travelerTip.jsp?Action=View&Place=Greece&Tip=HiHi&User=Jesper<Script>document.  
      getElementByTagName(‘Tip’)[child].innerHTML=‘<b>Our Service is Bad, Please Go to Other Site!</b>’</Script>
(d) 
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tion operator ADES (Add escape function calls), generates 
document.write(escape(document.URL. 
      substring(pos,document.URL.length)));
and then attempts to find a test case that results in a 
different number of HTML tags between the original state-
ment and its mutated statement. One such test case is
User → <Script>alert(‘XSSed!’)</Script>
MUTEC generates adequate test suites for exposing XSS 
vulnerabilities but requires intensive labor as the task of 
generating mutants is not automated. 
Vulnerability detection 
Other XSS defenses focus on identifying vulnerabilities 
in server-side scripts. Static-analysis-based approaches 
can prove the absence of vulnerabilities, but they tend to 
generate many false positives. Recent approaches com-
bine static analysis with dynamic analysis techniques to 
improve accuracy. 
Static analysis. These techniques identify tainted inputs 
accessed from external data sources, track the flow of 
tainted data, and check if any reached sinks such as SQL 
statements and HTML output statements. Benjamin Liv-
shits and Monica Lam used binary decision diagrams 
to apply points-to analysis to server-side scripts; their 
approach requires users to specify vulnerability patterns 
in Program Query Language.5 Yichen Xie and Alex Aiken 
proposed a static analysis technique that obtains block and 
function summary information from symbolic execution.6 
12 out.println(“Your Message:  ‘”+ 
       HTMLencode(new_tip)+ “’ is too long!”);
18 out.println(“‘”+HTMLencode(tip)+“’”);
25 document.write(escape(document.URL. 
      substring(pos,document.URL.length)));
Defensive coding practices, if applied appropriately, can 
completely remove all XSS vulnerabilities in Web applica-
tions. However, they are labor-intensive, prone to human 
error, and difficult to enforce in deployed applications. 
XSS testing 
Input validation testing could uncover XSS vulnerabili-
ties in Web applications. Specification-based IVT methods 
generate test cases with the aim of exercising various 
combinations of valid/invalid input conditions stated in 
specifications.3 To avoid the sole dependency on specifica-
tions, Nuo Li and colleagues attempted to infer valid input 
conditions by analyzing input fields and their surrounding 
texts in client-side scripts.3 Code-based IVT methods apply 
static analysis to extract valid/invalid input conditions from 
server-side scripts.3 In general, the effectiveness of both 
specification- and code-based approaches relies largely 
on the completeness of specifications or the adequacy of 
generated test suites for discovering XSS vulnerabilities in 
source code. 
Only test cases containing adequate XSS attack vec-
tors can induce original and mutated programs to behave 
differently. Hossain Shahriar and Mohammad Zulkernine 
developed MUTEC, a fault-based XSS testing tool that creates 
mutated programs by changing sensitive program state-
ments, or sinks, with mutation operators.4 For example, for 
the sink at line 25 in Figure 1b, MUTEC, through its muta-
Table 1. Comparison of XSS defenses.
Method
Code 
modification
User 
involvement
Applicable 
before 
deployment
Generate 
concrete 
attack
Locate 
vulnerability
Input 
source ID
Runtime 
overhead
XSS 
exploits 
addressed
Defensive coding Yes Intensive Yes Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable
Not 
applicable
All types
Input validation 
testing
No Intensive Yes Yes Not explicitly Yes No All types
Fault-based XSS 
testing
Yes Intensive Yes Yes Yes Yes No All types
Static analysis No Average Yes No Yes Yes No Reflected 
and stored
Static string 
analysis
No Low Yes Not 
explicitly
Yes Yes No Reflected 
and stored
Combined static 
and dynamic 
analysis
No Low Yes Yes Yes Yes No Reflected 
and stored
Server-side 
prevention
Yes Average No No No No Yes All types
Client-side 
prevention
No Intensive No No No No Yes All types
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Note that the program’s control flow structure (line 9) 
dictates that the variable new_tip must contain at least 100 
characters, but the CFG for new_tip results in the expres-
sion .* because Wassermann and Su’s approach cannot 
handle string-numeric interactions.
Combined static and dynamic analysis. Motivated by 
static-analysis-based approaches’ inability to identify 
faulty sanitization functions, Davide Balzarotti and 
colleagues developed the Saner tool, which checks the 
adequacy of sanitization functions for defending against 
XSS attacks.7 This successor to Pixy uses a static string 
analysis method similar to that proposed by Wassermann 
and Su to first identify the potentially faulty sanitization 
methods, then simulates the identified methods with a 
set of test inputs that contain attack strings and checks 
if any attack could still reach the sinks. 
Lam and colleagues carried out points-to analysis to 
track the flow of tainted data in a program and then used 
this information to instrument the program for model-
checking purposes.5 Applying the QED model checker based 
on Java Pathfinder (http://babelfish.arc.nasa.gov/trac/jpf), 
they simulated the instrumented program with inputs likely 
to lead to a match with user-specified vulnerability patterns. 
This approach’s effectiveness depends on the completeness 
of the vulnerability specifications and QED’s ability to ex-
plore as many different paths as possible.
Building on the work by Wassermann and col-
leagues, a team led by Adam Kiezun used concolic 
(concrete+symbolic) execution to capture program path 
constraints and a constraint solver to generate test inputs 
that explored various program paths.9 Upon reaching the 
sinks, they exercised two sets of inputs—one of ordinary 
valid strings and the other of attack strings from a library 
(http;//ha.ckers.org/xss.html)—and checked the differences 
between the resulting program behaviors. 
The following concolic execution sequences lead to the 
generation of an attack string that exploits the vulnerable 
statement at line 12 in Figure 1a:
1. Assign a program’s input parameters null values:
  action → null, place → null, new_tip → null 
2. The program executes on these inputs, capturing 
 the constraint 
  !(place !=null && action.equals(“Post”))
Pixy, an open source vulnerability scanner, includes 
alias analysis to improve accuracy.7 For example, for the 
program travelerTip.jsp in Figure 1a, it reports the following 
statements as vulnerable: 
11 out.println(“Your Post has been added 
       under Place ‘” + HTMLencode(place)+“’”);
12 out.println(“Your Message:  ‘”+
       new_tip+ “’ is too long!”); 
18 out.println(“‘”+tip+“’”);  
In this case, the reported vulnerable statement at line 11 
is a false positive because an escaping method sufficiently 
sanitizes the input. On the other hand, as it does not ana-
lyze travelerInfo.js in Figure 1b, it will miss a real vulnerable 
statement at line 25. 
Static-analysis-based techniques quickly detect potential 
XSS vulnerabilities in source code and are relatively easy 
for security personnel to implement and adopt. However, 
they cannot check the correctness of input sanitization 
functions and, instead, generally assume that unhandled or 
unknown functions return unsafe data. These approaches 
also miss DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities as they do not 
target client-side scripts.
Static string analysis. Gary Wassermann and Zhen-
dong Su enhanced the original taint-based approaches 
with string analysis.8 Their technique uses context-free 
grammars (CFGs) to represent the values a string variable 
can hold at a certain program point, which facilitates the 
checking of blacklisted string values in sensitive program 
statements. 
The enhancement provides more accuracy as it can ana-
lyze string operations’ effects on inputs. However, when 
conducting static string analysis, it is difficult to model 
complex operations such as string-numeric interaction; 
thus, this approach can result in false positives if analysts 
make conservative approximations when handling such 
operations. Static string analysis also suffers from the limi-
tations of blacklist comparisons. 
For the program in Figure 1a, Wassermann and Su’s ap-
proach produces the following CFGs (represented using Perl 
regular expression notation) for tainted strings at each sink:
At line 11: HTMLencode(place) →  
                ([^ &<>]*(&(amp|lt|gt);)*[^ &<>]*)*
At line 12: new_tip → .*
At line 18: tip → .*
In this case, static string analysis reports the statement at 
line 11 as safe because the expression ([^ &<>]*(&(amp|lt
|gt);)*[^&<>]*)* does not allow the tags < and >, which 
are the special characters an XSS exploit would use. It also 
reports that the statements at line 12 and 18 are unsafe be-
cause the expression .* represents any string values and, as 
such, any attack strings in new_tip and tip would execute 
at these statements. 
Static-analysis-based approaches can prove 
the absence of XSS vulnerabilities, but they 
tend to generate many false positives.
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3. To explore a new control flow path, negate the cap- 
 tured constraint:
  place !=null && action.equals(“Post”)
4. The constraint solver solves the above constraint 
 and generates new input values:
  action → Post, place → 1, new_tip → null  
5. The program executes on these new inputs, cap- 
 turing the constraint 
  place !=null && action.equals(“Post”)  
       && new_tip.length < 100
6. Similar to (2), generate a new constraint:
  place !=null && action.equals(“Post”)  
       && new_tip.length >= 100
Kiezun and colleagues’ current solver cannot solve the 
constraint new_tip.length >= 100 as it requires complex 
analysis of string operations that return numeric values. 
Instead of solving it, the concolic engine executes random 
inputs and checks if the path satisfying this constraint is 
exercised. If it generates the inputs 
 action → Post, place → 1, 
 new_tip → 1…1 (a hundred of ‘1’s)
within a given time, the engine exercises a new control 
flow path and finds a sink referencing the tainted variable 
new_tip (at line 12).
Once it encounters such a statement, the attack gen-
erator alters the current values of the input parameters 
referenced in the statement using attack strings and re-
executes the program. If the altered inputs result in the 
same control flow path, the engine finds a real attack vector 
such as
 action → Post, place → 1, 
 new_tip → 1…1<Script>alert(‘XSSed!’)</Script>
Combined static and dynamic analysis can create con-
crete attack vectors and thus avoid false positives; it also 
enables fully automated test case generation. However, 
current implementations only work on server-side scripts; 
more research is needed on client-side script analysis. 
This approach has two other weaknesses, both of which 
can result in false negatives. First, the attack string library 
might not be complete due to the everyday introduction 
of new attacks. The program’s sanitization routines might 
trap the sample attack vectors generated during testing, 
but some real-life attack vectors might circumvent those 
routines. Second, this technique suffers from state space 
explosion and thus might miss some vulnerabilities in deep 
state spaces. 
Currently, there is no universal solution to the state space 
explosion problem. Among recent empirical studies, QED 
struggled at testing the Java-based JGossip (80,000 lines 
of code) Web application due to the more than 30 billion 
possible test cases, and Kiezun and colleagues’ Ardilla tool 
only achieved 14 percent line coverage for the PHP-based 
phpBB (35,000 LOC) Web application.5,9
Characterizing bug patterns using pattern analysis and 
predicting unknown bugs using pattern matching and data 
mining might ease the first problem, while more effec-
tive string constraint solving techniques and AI algorithms 
could mitigate the second. 
Runtime attack prevention 
The final group of XSS defenses focus on preventing real-
time attacks using intrusion detection systems or runtime 
monitors, which can be deployed on either the server side 
or client side. In general, these methods set up a proxy 
between the client and server to intercept incoming or out-
going HTTP traffic. The proxy then checks the HTTP data 
for illegal scripts or verifies the resulting URL connections 
against security policies.
Server-side prevention. Yao-Wen Huang and col-
leagues developed the WebSSARI (Web Security via 
Static Analysis and Runtime Inspection) tool, which per-
forms type-based static analysis to identify potentially 
vulnerable code sections and instrument them with 
runtime guards.10 Users specify preconditions of sensi-
tive functions—for example, those that contain HTML 
outputs—and postconditions of sanitization functions. 
During runtime, instrumented guards check for conform-
ance of these user-specified conditions. 
Other approaches use dynamic taint-tracking mecha-
nisms to monitor the flow of input data at runtime.10 They 
ensure that these inputs are syntactically confined (only 
treated as literal values) and do not contain unsafe content 
defined in user-specified security policies. 
Instead of tracking tainted data, a proposed technique 
tracks untainted or trusted strings, such as those defined 
by programmers, and ensures that SQL statements’ syn-
tactic contents have only these strings.10 Although this 
defense focuses on SQL injection, it can be extended to 
Combined static and dynamic analysis can 
create concrete attack vectors and thus 
avoid false positives; it also enables fully 
automated test case generation.
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Client-side prevention provides a personal protection 
layer for clients so that they need not rely on the security 
of Web applications. Its main disadvantage is that it re-
quires client actions whenever a connection violates the 
filter rules. Moreover, although this approach addresses all 
types of XSS attacks, it only detects exploits that send user 
information to a third-party server, not other exploits such 
as those involving Web content manipulation. 
TOOL SUPPORT
Implementations of some XSS defenses are available 
online. 
To help developers practice its defensive coding rules, 
OWASP has created the Enterprise Security API (ESAPI; 
https://owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Enterprise_
Security_API), an open source library for many different 
programming languages. Microsoft also provides the Web 
Protection Library (http://wpl.codeplex.com) for .NET de-
velopers. These libraries provide many escaping APIs and 
other security control features. 
Pixy (http://pixybox.seclab.tuwien.ac.at/pixy) imple-
ments static analysis on PHP 4 source code. The string 
analyzer tool (http://score.is.tsukuba.ac.jp/~minamide/
phpsa) also works on PHP programs. The concolic engine 
Ardilla is not available, but its underlying string constraint 
solver Hampi (http://people.csail.mit.edu/akiezun/hampi) 
is accessible as an independent tool. WebSSARI has been 
commercialized as CodeSecure (www.armorize.com). 
Noxes will soon be available as an open source tool (http://
iseclab.org/projects/noxes). Currently it only works on 
MS Windows, and in a similar way to Windows personal 
firewalls. 
Various off-the-shelf scanners can also detect XSS vul-
nerabilities. SecTools maintains a list of the top scanners 
(http://sectools.org/web-scanners.html). The list includes 
popular commercial systems such as Acunetix’s Web 
Vulnerability Scanner (www.acunetix.com/vulnerabil-
ity-scanner) and IBM’s Rational AppScan family (http://
address XSS because of the similarity of SQL injection 
and XSS exploits.
XSS-Guard transforms server programs so that they 
produce a shadow webpage, which reflects the program’s 
intended output, for each real response page.11 As Figure 
4 shows, before sending the real response page to clients, 
XSS-Guard checks for differences in the script contents of 
real and shadow pages. 
Some server-side prevention approaches require the 
collaboration of browsers. One example is BEEP (Browser-
Enforced Embedded Policies), a mechanism that modifies 
the browser so that it cannot execute illegitimate scripts.11 
Security policies dictate what data the server sends to 
BEEP-enabled-browsers. 
In contrast to BEEP, Blueprint is a server-side tool that 
works on existing browsers.11 To evade unreliable pars-
ing behaviors, the server takes over the browser’s task of 
parsing untrusted HTML contents—those parts that might 
contain XSS vulnerabilities—and embeds the generated 
parse tree as a model in place of the actual untrusted con-
tent. It also embeds a model interpreter so that the browser 
can interpret the embedded models and produce the HTML 
documents as intended. 
Server-side prevention can, in principle, prevent all XSS 
attacks because it checks actual runtime values of inputs 
and no approximation is necessary. However, it incurs run-
time overhead due to interception of HTTP traffic. It also 
requires code instrumentation to enable dynamic moni-
toring and installation of additional (possibly complex) 
frameworks and, in some cases, user-defined security poli-
cies, both of which can be labor-intensive.  
Client-side prevention. Noxes acts as a personal fire-
wall that allows or blocks connections to websites on the 
basis of filter rules, which are basically user-specified URL 
whitelists and blacklists.12 When the browser sends an 
HTTP request to an unknown website, Noxes immediately 
alerts the client, who chooses to permit or deny the con-
nection, and remembers the client’s action for future use. 
Figure 4. XSS-Guard server-side prevention mechanism. (a) Sample code transformed from a part (lines 15-19) of the program in 
Figure 1a. (b) Server-side attack prevention.
Client XSS-Guard proxy XSS-Guard-transformed
travelingForum
1. Client visits travelerTip (now transformed by XSS-Guard)
     in “View” action after an attacker has posted a malicious message
2. Server generates two webpages, real and shadow;
     the real page is generated with actual runtime values, while the
     shadow page is generated with XSS-Guard-supplied benign values
3. XSS-Guard intercepts the pages, detects the dierence
     in their script contents, and prevents the attack
X
StringBuffer re= “”; //real response
StringBuffer sh= “”;//shadow response     
  . . .
re.append(“Here are the tips….”);
re.append(“Here are the tips….”);
while(rs.next()) {
     String tip= rs.getString(“tip”);
     String tip_c= “a”;
     re.append(“‘”+tip+“’”);
     sh.append(“‘”+tip_c+“’”); 
  . . .
re.append(“</body></html>”);
sh.append(“</body></html>”);
re= XSS-PREVENT(re, sh);
(a) (b)
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www-01.ibm.com/software/awdtools/appscan), as well as 
open source scanners such as OWASP’s WebScarab (https://
owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_WebScarab_Proj-
ect) and Paros (http://parosproxy.org). All of these scanners 
generally use either crawlers or proxies to fetch webpages 
and then inject predefined attack vectors into response 
pages, letting users verify the resulting behaviors.
Existing techniques for defending against XSS exploits suffer from various weaknesses: inherent limitations, incomplete implementations, complex frameworks, 
runtime overhead, and intensive manual-work require-
ments. Security researchers can address these weaknesses 
from two different perspectives. 
From a development perspective, researchers need to 
craft simpler, better, and more flexible security defenses. 
They need to look beyond current techniques by incor-
porating more effective input validation and sanitization 
features. In time, development tools will incorporate 
security frameworks such as ESAPI that implement state-
of-the-art technology.
From a program verification perspective, researchers 
must integrate program analysis, pattern recognition, con-
colic testing, data mining, and AI algorithms—heretofore 
used to solve different software engineering problems—to 
enhance the effectiveness of vulnerability detection. They 
can also improve the precision of current methods by ac-
quiring attack code patterns from outside experts as soon 
as they become available. 
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